Critiques of Pickstock's reading of Duns Scotus

Mary Beth Ingham has sought to correct Pickstock's reading of Duns Scotus in After Writing and other essays. Pickstock has blamed modernity on Scotus. What an absurd sentence. But he certainly plays the Judas to her Christ (Aquinas). What an absurd sentence. At any rate Modern Theology thought this debate about Scotus was so important that it merited an entire issue in 2005. I've selected quotes from Ingham's article "Why Pickstock is bad and Scotus is Good", I mean "Re-situating Scotist Thought". At any rate, I can see why equivocation becomes an appealing alternative to univocity and analogy. Everybody is as they are, forget about it. I think that is the logic of capitalism isn't it. Have a coffee my friend, forget about politics! But remember your cup was made with oil products. Ok, here are some highlights from Ingham's article. I especially found the part on formal-modal distinctions helpful, as I have never really understood was was going on there (though like other philosophical problems, I knew this problem innately, I just didn't know what symbolic code matched up to what I already thought. You know somewhere deep inside, I've got most of it figured out...).
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Ingham maintains:

In their respective disciplines (logic and theology) the concept being functions differently. In the domain of logic it functions univocally (since the alternative offered by Henry of Ghent was equivocation disguised as analogy). In
the domain of theology, and particularly in regard to the names of God, the term functions analogically. (611)

Christocentric Theology of Scotus:

The first key element in Scotus’s view of reality and of the relationship of philosophy to theology is the centrality of the Incarnation. Because his vision
is so predominantly Christocentric and so affirming of the sui generis nature of Christian revelation, Scotus both critiques the natural capacity of human reason to grasp everything about God and moves his consideration of creation (both in its contingency and in the logical categories used to discuss it) to a secondary status. Thus, he would not hold (with Aquinas and Aristotle) that this world is the only one possible, nor (with Aristotle) that its unique existence points to a single, necessary prime mover. Nor would he hold (with Aquinas and Aristotle) that the life of natural virtue and the philosopher’s goal of happiness (felicitas) are sufficient reasons to demonstrate immortality. This is not because he holds that reason cannot demonstrate the soul’s immortality. Rather, he holds that natural reason cannot
(alone) demonstrate the sort of immortality promised by Christianity (cf. 1 Cor. 2: “eye has not seen nor has ear heard . . .”). (613)

Univocity

The final element of Pickstock’s critique of Scotus is the affirmation of the univocity of the concept being and its lethal consequences for any defense of
transcendence and a spiritual ascent. This point deserves a more careful treatment. Scotus sets forth his argument for the univocity of being in Ordinatio I, distinction 3, question 1.12 The text deals specifically with the possibility of knowledge about God and, by implication, of the existence of theology as a science. Here, the Franciscan develops his position on the univocity of being in tandem with a discussion of scientific knowledge of God. Together, both constitute the sine qua non condition for any possible theology: human cognition must have some natural basis from which to reflect on the divine. This natural ground is, in Scotist thought, the univocity of the concept of being. If, in his argument, Scotus can show that the human mind has foundational access to reality, and if that reality provides adequate basis for natural knowledge of God, then theology can be understood as a science,
whose content does not exhaust the truth about God.

Scotus reasons from the discussion of language about God to the deeper consideration of the sort of foundation that would explain how such language is possible (namely, that being rather than quidditas is the first object of the intellect). In this, he follows his usual methodological procedure, moving from experience to what grounds the possibility of that experience. In addition, Scotus bases his argument upon the Aristotelian cognitive model, where sense knowledge, mental species and agent intellect form the constitutive parts. Finally, the Subtle Doctor rejects Henry of Ghent’s proposed illumination theory, along with its argument from analogy. For Scotus, Henry’s position on analogy without an underlying univocity of concepts is
simply equivocation. The Franciscan argues that when we conceive of God as wise, we consider a property (wisdom) that perfects nature. In order that we might do this and in light of the cognitive structure Aristotle provides, we must first have in mind some essence in which the property exists. When we consider properties or attributes such as wisdom, we do not understand them as pure abstraction, but as belonging to an essence. This more basic, quidditative concept is a type of conceptual whatness that grounds the act of cognition. Were such a concept not univocal, theology could not be a science, nor would language about God be meaningful.(616)

Formal Modal Distinction

The formal modal distinction is key to understanding the way in which Scotus presents the relationship of cognition to the natural world and then to language about God. The formal modal distinction is related to but not identical with the formal distinction. This modal distinction applies not to different attributes or aspects of a being (as does the formal distinction), but to the distinction between a subject, such as intelligence in humans, and its mode, such as finite. The significance of the formal modal distinction becomes clear when we understand its role as foundation for those concepts that are predicable univocally of God and creatures. Consider, for example, the concept wisdom as predicable of God and creatures. Scotus asks, “How
can the concept common to God and creatures be considered real unless it can be abstracted from some reality of the same kind?”13 In response, he explains the difference between the modal distinction and the strict formal distinction. A perfection and its intrinsic mode, such as infinite wisdom, are not so identical that we cannot conceive of the perfection (wisdom) without the mode (infinity). We can, indeed, conceive of wisdom independently of whether it is finite (human wisdom) or infinite (divine wisdom). The perfection and mode are not really distinct, however, because they cannot be separated in reality; nor are they formally distinct, because they are not two formalities each capable of terminating a distinct and proper concept. Nonetheless, they are still not identical, because the objective reality signified by the perfection with its modal intensity (infinite wisdom) is not precisely the same as that signified by the perfection alone (wisdom). The formal modal distinction, then, actually safeguards the reality of those concepts, such as being, that are predicable of God and creatures. Without the mode, these sorts of concepts are common and imperfect. They function semantically in a confused manner, designating in a general way. With the mode, the concept is called proper, and has a more focused, specifying role. The referent (that is, the being designated as infinite) emerges more clearly within the field, like a figure against a background. The formal modal distinction, in a manner similar to the formal distinction, is linked to the activity of abstractive cognition. The modal distinction’s specificity can be clearly seen when we reflect upon the experience of the beatific vision. The blessed in heaven, states Scotus, perceive the infinite perfection of divine infinite
wisdom intuitively, not as two formal objects, but as one.14 By contrast, no intuition in heaven erases the formal distinction between the divine persons and the divine essence, or between the divine intellect and the divine will. In short, the formal distinction is such that it remains even in the beatific vision, while the formal modal distinction does not.15 (616-7)

Footnote 7
Aquinas’s insistence on the light of glory (lumen gloriae) needed for the beatific vision is challenged by Scotus as a diminishment of the natural powers of the human person. When he presents and defends the key role of intuitive cognition, Scotus notes that it follows from the natural constitution of the human person as created by God. It was known to Jesus and thus belongs to human nature. With his Franciscan insight of viewing the person as imago Christi (a perspective shared by Bonaventure), Scotus does not hesitate to attribute to the human person any perfection that does not contradict Scripture or right reasoning.
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Now let's all hold hands and kiss. Right, we've done away with kissing. Pick up your gun instead...